
2nd edition · EN + ZH PDFs · 14 figures, 20 tables · 90 Form 4 filings parsed · 3-scenario target
USDT-TRC20 · Alipay (CNY equivalent) · File download delivery
Prepared by the TopX team from public information and reviewed and revised by professional investment managers and fund managers before release. Reviewers take part in a personal capacity, do not represent their respective employers and provide no investment advisory services through this site. Research content, not investment advice.
Method: every call registered in the period is shown — nothing is selected out. Hit rate = hits ÷ (hits + misses); open calls are excluded from the denominator. Outcomes are judged against the falsification conditions stated in each report. Past performance does not indicate future results. Not investment advice.
Vertiv Holdings Co (NYSE: VRT) company deep dive, second edition. Two PDFs from one source: 35 pages in Chinese, 29 in English, each 14 chapters plus three appendices, with 14 figures and 20 data tables, identical table for table. Reference date: close of 21 August 2026.
| # | Finding | The number | Why it is absent from public discussion |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The company stopped disclosing orders, backlog and book-to-bill | Disclosed every quarter for ten quarters, then zero in both 2026 quarters | Confirming it requires parsing all 12 quarterly releases, stripping the forward-looking boilerplate, and counting terms in what remains |
| 2 | EMEA organic growth is negative, entirely hidden by the consolidated figure | H1 2026 −14.8% (products −18.1%) against Americas +31.0% | The reported figure shows only −8.4%: FX contributed $49.9m and acquisitions $6.2m |
| 3 | A third of first-half EPS growth is tax | effective rate 28.8% → 16.1%; at the prior-year rate growth is +53.4%, not +80.8% | Only visible by attributing revenue → gross → operating → pre-tax → net → EPS layer by layer |
| 4 | Zero insider buying in twelve months, and every seller is a director | sold $142.1m, bought $0; genuine reduction $100.8m, 91.9% from the board | Requires parsing 90 Form 4 filings from raw XML and separating codes S / M / F / G |
| 5 | $1.67bn of acquisitions in a year, 87.8% into thermal | PurgeRite $1,138m + Great Lakes $204m + three Q2 2026 deals $332m | The company discloses no liquid cooling revenue, but it does disclose what it paid for liquid cooling |
Source: SEC EDGAR (CIK 0001674101) — 12 quarterly earnings releases, 10-K, 10-Q, 90 Form 4 filings; peer comparison from Eaton plc's 10-Q (CIK 0001551182).
| Metric | Latest | Prior year | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 2026 net sales | $3,274m | $2,638m | +24.1%; organic +18%, acquisitions +5%, FX +1% |
| GAAP operating margin | 19.5% | 16.8% | adjusted 22.6% (+410bp) |
| Q2 2026 diluted EPS | $1.27 | $0.83 | +53.0%; adjusted $1.52 |
| H1 2026 adjusted free cash flow | $1,578m | $542m | +191%; net cash at quarter end |
| Backlog (last disclosed) | $15.0bn | $7.2bn | 31 Dec 2025; not disclosed in either 2026 quarter |
| Inventory days | 113 | 74 | a verifiable trace of the capacity constraint |
| Credit rating | Baa3 / BBB− | sub-investment grade | investment grade achieved February 2026 |
| Forward P/E (adjusted guidance) | 39.1x | — | 44.6x on GAAP; 59.3x TTM |
| Scenario | Probability | FY2027 revenue | Adjusted EPS | Forward P/E | Target | vs current |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Upside | 25% | $18.2bn | $9.60 | 38x | $365 | +39.3% |
| Base | 50% | $17.1bn | $8.70 | 31x | $270 | +3.1% |
| Downside | 25% | $15.1bn | $7.55 | 22x | $166 | −36.6% |
| Probability-weighted | 100% | — | — | — | $268 | +2.3% |
Source: our calculation. The rating is Neutral / Hold, start date 21 August 2026, benchmark the S&P 500. Two reverse-engineering paths are shown: a reverse DCF puts implied free cash flow growth at 17.9% compound for ten years with 70% of enterprise value in the terminal value; an exit-multiple path requires four further years of 35.6% compound growth after the $14.0bn guidance for a 12% annualised return.
| Figure | Subject | Why it is drawn this way |
|---|---|---|
| 2–3 | Twelve quarters of backlog, organic order growth and book-to-bill | Quarters the company did not disclose are drawn as hatched placeholders labelled "not disclosed", never as zero. Disguising a disclosure gap as a zero is the most common way a chart lies |
| 4 | Four hyperscalers' actual capex, 2021–2025, stacked | Uses actual outflows from each 10-K cash flow statement rather than a sum of guidance; the −7% bar in 2023 is left in the chart |
| 5–7 | Inventory days and deferred revenue; cash flow and capex; revenue and margin | Measures of different scale always go in stacked panels, never on a dual axis. In a dual-axis chart the crossing point is chosen by whoever picked the scales, not by the data |
| 8 | EPS growth attribution waterfall | Splits +80.8% into revenue +26.7, gross margin +14.5, opex leverage +5.8, interest +7.2, tax +27.5, share count −0.9 |
| 11 | Insider sales by person, in three colours | Outright reduction / cashless exercise / net accumulator are coloured separately, because adding them into one $142m figure conflates three different things |
| 12 | Vertiv versus Eaton segment operating margin | Both define segment profit as excluding corporate cost and intangible amortisation, so the comparison holds; the peer data comes from Eaton's own 10-Q, not a second-hand summary |
The chart palette passes all five checks for colour-vision separation, lightness band and contrast (adjacent-pair CVD ΔE 9.4, normal-vision ΔE 19.4, both above threshold).
| Chapter | Subject | What the report concludes |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | Demand, the cause layer: three metrics and their disappearance | A twelve-quarter disclosure-continuity table; how to read the $5.5bn single-quarter backlog jump in Q4 2025 (≈54% of FY2025 revenue) |
| 4 | Financial quality: intermediate layers before results | Three independent pieces of evidence from three different documents, all pointing at a supply-side constraint |
| 7 | Governance and insider behaviour | Pay is measured on adjusted operating profit and adjusted free cash flow, with no revenue metric; 90 Form 4 filings broken out person by person |
| 9 | Capital allocation (new in this edition) | $1.67bn of consideration for roughly $450m of annualised revenue, about 3.7× sales; the earn-out chain from $139.2m to $206.1m |
| 11 | Three scenarios and four decision rules | Three entry conditions, exit rules with four thesis stops, position cap and time stop, review cadence, all written in advance |
| 13 | Eight commonly misread numbers | Including "+252% order growth" and "the risk factors disclose a material weakness" |
| 14 | Tracking metrics and falsification | Seven metrics each with supporting and overturning thresholds; four core judgments each with its overturning condition |
This report was rewritten after an adversarial audit. Five substantive revisions: ① corrected the first edition's statement that backlog is disclosed annually only — it was disclosed every quarter through Q4 2025 and then discontinued, and Chapter 2 is rewritten around that; ② hyperscaler capex moved from media compilation ([B]) to each company's 10-K actual spend ([A]); ③ added a primary peer comparison against Eaton, replacing a single second-hand comparison; ④ added Chapter 9 on capital allocation; ⑤ all 14 figures are new. The revision log is printed in Appendix C, not hidden.
Primary sources are SEC EDGAR filings (CIK 0001674101): 10-K, 10-Q, 12 quarterly earnings releases, DEF 14A and 90 Form 4 filings, plus XBRL companyfacts covering 30 quarters from 2019Q1 to 2026Q2; the peer comparison uses Eaton plc's 10-Q; the demand anchor uses Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet and Meta 10-K filings. Claims carry [A]/[B]/[C]/[D] evidence grades. Appendix B lists, item by item, the twelve things this report did not do — including no earnings call transcript, no market share quantification, no customer concentration figure, and no proven cause for the disclosure interruption.
Compiled independently by the TopX research team from public information, then reviewed and revised before release by professional investment managers and fund managers with asset-management experience. Reviewers take part in a personal capacity, do not represent their respective employers, and provide no investment advisory services through TopXEA; TopXEA holds no investment-adviser licence in any jurisdiction. Primary filings (SEC, exchanges, company disclosures) are the first-priority source, key figures require corroboration from at least two independent sources, claims carry [A]/[B]/[C]/[D] evidence grades, and known limitations are disclosed item by item inside the report. This is research content. It does not constitute investment advice and is not tailored to any particular investor; past data and forward projections do not indicate future results. Please note before purchase: digital goods are non-refundable once delivered.
For ten consecutive quarters Vertiv disclosed order growth, book-to-bill and backlog every quarter. In Q4 2025 those read +252%, 2.9x and $15.0bn — then all three vanished, with zero disclosure in the two quarters since. Includes the reproducible method, and the trap that produces the opposite conclusion if you skip it.
We parsed all 90 of Vertiv's (NYSE: VRT) Forms 4 over twelve months, 150 transactions, one at a time. Strip out cashless exercises and net accumulators and the usable figure is $100.8m — of which 91.9% came from the board, while the CEO and CFO sold nothing. Reproducible steps included.
Same EA, same .set, two different equity curves. We isolated the chart timeframe in a controlled test: 60× the bar count, and every figure in both reports came back identical. The variables that actually move the number are elsewhere — ranked by impact, with our own measured data.
We pulled and read both of Palantir's 20 August Forms 144. A Form 144 is a notice of intent, not a sale; one filing names its 10b5-1 adoption date and the other leaves the field blank — and that field is where all the information sits. Plus a share-count trap that understates price-to-sales by 4.3%.