
9 markets · 105 listed companies · 10 core pass-throughs · 155 pages · evidence-graded
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This report is being revised and is not on sale.
Prepared by the TopX team from public information and reviewed and revised by professional investment managers and fund managers before release. Reviewers take part in a personal capacity, do not represent their respective employers and provide no investment advisory services through this site. Research content, not investment advice.
A full teardown of the global AI value chain, from upstream equipment to downstream applications. Every figure is anchored to the 13 August 2026 close and a single FX set, so comparisons work across markets.
| Dimension | Count | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Markets | 9 | US, mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Germany, France |
| Listed companies | 105 | combined market cap ≈ $44.2 trillion |
| Key private companies | 30 | including OpenAI, Anthropic and other nodes in the deal network |
| Core pass-throughs | 10 | fixed five-section template each, plus 12 ownership and supply-chain diagrams |
| Length | 155 pages | 13 chapters; 80 tables, 29 charts |
| Reference date | 2026-08-13 | closing prices and FX anchored to the same moment |
The report's "three-layer, six-segment hourglass" framework identifies three choke points: TSMC CoWoS packaging, the HBM trio, and ASML EUV lithography. The longest single-point dependency chain runs four layers deep, with no second supplier at any layer:
| Layer | Company | Function | Second supplier |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | TRUMPF / Zeiss | EUV light source and optics | none |
| 2 | ASML | EUV lithography systems | none |
| 3 | TSMC | leading-edge nodes and CoWoS packaging | none |
| 4 | NVIDIA | AI accelerators | none |
Source: chapter 4, chain map and value distribution. A capacity or policy change at any layer propagates to everything downstream.
| Metric | Value | Basis and meaning |
|---|---|---|
| 2026 capex guidance, five US hyperscalers | ≈ $802.5bn | sum of guidance midpoints; +86% versus 2025 actual, the source variable for the whole chain |
| NVIDIA FY2027 Q1 revenue | $81.6bn (+85%) | China share down from 21.9% to 5.6% |
| Micron FQ3 FY2026 revenue | +346% YoY | GAAP gross margin 84.6%, at a forward P/E of about 6.6x |
| NVIDIA share of TSMC CoWoS capacity | ≈ 60% | set to exceed 20% of TSMC revenue in 2026, passing Apple for the first time |
| Gross margin at the two ends of one chain | NVIDIA ≈ 75% vs FII 7.15% | the spread in value capture along a single chain |
| Oracle remaining performance obligations | $638bn (+363%) | about $300bn from OpenAI alone; full-year free cash flow −$23.7bn |
Source: company SEC filings and results releases. Every figure carries an evidence grade and a source inside the report.
| Segment | Companies |
|---|---|
| Compute silicon and accelerators | NVIDIA, Broadcom, Cambricon |
| Wafer fabrication and advanced packaging | TSMC, SMIC |
| Semiconductor equipment | ASML |
| Memory and HBM | SK hynix |
| Cloud platforms and foundation models | Microsoft |
| Optical modules and server assembly | Innolight, Foxconn Industrial Internet |
Each follows the same five-section template: operating data → top ten holders → board and management → two-way supply-chain pass-through → valuation and key variables.
One chapter is set aside for the hardest part of the AI chain to characterise: OpenAI's four-way counterparty relationships, Anthropic being invested in and supplied by four giants at once, and NVIDIA's outbound investment network split transaction by transaction into closed and announced. Bull and bear arguments are quantified side by side, without a position.
Eleven segments are ranked by cycle position, from memory and HBM (1st) to AI software applications (11th), each with three scenarios (50% / 20% / 30%) and observable trigger signals.
| Practice | What it means |
|---|---|
| Four-level evidence grading | every key figure carries [A]/[B]/[C]/[D]: A = primary filings, B = major media, C = analyst estimates, D = unverified. Conflicting figures are shown side by side, never silently resolved |
| Anti-misreading manual | 18 widely circulated factual errors corrected; 23 open questions listed with both readings |
| Strict basis management | fiscal-year mismatches flagged; three capex definitions separated; A/H market caps marked non-additive; P/Es distorted by one-off gains labelled as distorted |
| Chapters | Subject |
|---|---|
| 1–2 | Summary and core conclusions · Methodology and data verification |
| 3–4 | Industry overview · Chain map and value distribution |
| 5–7 | Upstream: compute hardware · Midstream: cloud and foundation models · Downstream: applications and software |
| 8–9 | Core-company deep dives · Cross-holdings and investment network |
| 10–12 | Financial and valuation comparison · Risk factors · Investment views |
| 13 | Appendices: verification worksheets and source list |
Compiled independently by the TopX research team from public information, then reviewed and revised before release by professional investment managers and fund managers with asset-management experience. Reviewers take part in a personal capacity, do not represent their respective employers, and provide no investment advisory services through TopXEA; TopXEA holds no investment-adviser licence in any jurisdiction. Primary filings (SEC, exchanges, company disclosures) are the first-priority source, key figures require corroboration from at least two independent sources, claims carry [A]/[B]/[C]/[D] evidence grades, and known limitations are disclosed item by item inside the report. This is research content — not investment advice — and is not tailored to any investor; historical data and forward projections do not guarantee future results. Digital goods are non-refundable once delivered.
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